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6.4. The Case of Croatia*
Introduction
Some key characteristics of the legislation pertaining to
the Pension Fund industry in Croatia are outlined below.
Those characteristics may be used to compile the different
foreign countries’ approaches (instruments) in addressing
the concrete risks we have identified (prioritised and gen-
eralised) in our report so far.
6.4.1. General Remarks: the Fund and
the Company
Mandatory and voluntary supplementary pension insur-
ance are both based upon individual capitalised savings. An
Agency for Supervision of Pension Funds and Pension Insur-
ance is established – the Agency grants licenses and super-
vises Pension Investment Funds and their governing Pension
Management Companies.
The Pension Management Companies are joint-stock or
limited-liability companies. Those are actually the Invest-
ment Fund Management Companies as defined in the Law
on Investment Funds.
A Pension Fund is the open-end investment fund as
defined in the Law on Investment Funds. A Fund is com-
prised of amounts of contributions made by Fund members
plus amounts of the returns on investing the contributions.
A Fund is owned by its members. A minimum number of
members is required (80 thousand for mandatory, 2 thou-
sand for voluntary funds in the third year of operation): if
the number of members falls below the statutory minimum
for three months, authorisation is to be revoked.
The only object of activity of the Companies must be
the administration of Funds, their representation before
third parties and activities related to carrying out pension
management business. A Pension Company may establish
and manage one Fund only.
The registered name of the Companies shall contain the
name ‘Pension Management Company’: only licensed Com-
panies may use such words in their registered names.
Each Pension Company shall be liable to Fund members
for damages resulting from any failure to perform its oblig-
ations pertaining to the administration of the Fund.
6.4.2. Managers’ Qualifications
A member of the Board of Management or Supervisory
Board of a Pension Company must satisfy the requirement
of the Company Law, as well as the following special
requirements:
– must have a degree,
– must have professional work experience in the field of
banking, accountancy, insurance or financial services for at
least five years.
6.4.3. Information Disclosure
A Fund shall no later than 31 March each year publish an
information prospectus about the previous year. The infor-
mation prospectus shall be made available for inspection by
anyone who applies for membership in the Fund, as well as
by the current Fund members.
The Pension Company shall at least once in every six
months provide each Fund member with information about
the assets standing to the member’s account. Such informa-
tion is to be provided upon e request by the members too,
a fee for that may be imposed which cannot exceed the cost
of providing the statement.
At least once a year a Pension Company shall disclose
information on the value and proportion of the Fund’s
assets invested in particular securities, including details of
the issuers.
The Pension Companies also submit various kind of
information to the Regulator: annually or at other intervals
specified by the Regulator.
A Pension Company shall keep an archive of all docu-
ments and other records related to the Fund it manages.
6.4.4. Selling Practices
No one may offer any collateral benefits (cash incen-
tives, gifts, etc.) to a person for the purpose of persuading
him to become or remain a Fund member. No one may
offer such benefits to a trade union or other collective enti-
ty for the purpose of inducing or rewarding that entity to
persuade its members to join a particular Fund.
No one may make any claims or predictions relating to
the future investment performance of a Fund.
6.4.5. The Licensing Stage
‘Authorisation’ by the Regulator is needed prior to estab-
lishing a Pension Company. A separate ‘license’ is needed by
the Regulator prior to undertaking the administration of a
Fund. The register of trade cannot register a Pension Com-
pany until it has been granted that separate license. Once
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authorisation is granted, incorporating the Pension Compa-
ny is obligatory within six months. Authorisation to incorpo-
rate a Pension Company does not guarantee a license to
carry on Fund management.
While reviewing the authorisation application proce-
dure, the Regulator may cooperate with other competent
regulatory authorities.
Within thirty days after incorporation, the Pension Com-
pany must submit an application for a license. If a license is
granted, the Pension Company may commence the business
of managing a Fund no earlier than the date of the issue of
the license.
Any subsequent changes in the documents or the infor-
mation submitted when applying for a license, require a
prior approval by the Regulator.
An authorisation of functioning of a Pension Fund is also
required: application for it should be made by the managing
Pension Company at the same time as the Company itself
applies for a license. The Regulator co-operates with other
competent authorities while reviewing the application.
The Fund may contract a custodian or an external asset
manager, and may start accepting contributions, only after
authorisation for the functioning of the Fund and a license
for the governing Company are granted.
6.4.6. Investing the Company’s and the Fund’s
Assets
A Pension Company may not grant loans or provide guar-
antees. It may not borrow or take credits, including the issue
of bonds, with a total value in excess of a percentage of the
value of its own capital, as determined by the Regulator.
A Pension Company may acquire part or all of the share
capital of another Pension Company with the prior consent
of the Regulator.
The assets of the Fund are invested according to the
principles of security, diversity and liquidity. A ‘statement of
investment principles’ is drawn up in advance by the Super-
visory Board of the Company. That statement is regularly
reviewed and amended, as well as disclosed.
Fund’s assets may only be invested in particularly speci-
fied by law classes of securities. Amongst those are:
shares and securities registered with the Securities
Commission on account of having been placed through a
public offering and provided that they are traded on the
Zagreb Stock Exchange or other organised markets; for-
eign securities as set out in the regulations of the Securi-
ties Commission; foreign and domestic mutual and
investment funds investing primarily in quoted equities in
OECD countries.
The Securities Commission may impose maximum, but
not minimum (with the exception of requiring a minimum of
50% investment in central government long-term bonds),
proportions of the Fund’s assets being invested in particular
instruments.
The Fund’s assets may not be invested in: securities
unlisted or not publicly traded; physical assets which are not
frequently quoted on organised markets or for which valua-
tion is uncertain (antiques, works of art, motor vehicles);
real estate or any interest in real estate.
Asset valuation and accounting
The value of the assets of a Fund shall be determined in
accordance with the valuation principles. The Regulator shall
issue regulations detailing principles for valuing the assets
and liabilities of Funds.
Net assets of the Fund are valued on ‘valuation dates’ as
determined by the Regulator, but not less often than once a
month. The return for the last 24 months is determined by
the Company governing the Fund at the end of each quar-
ter: the investment return is based on the valuation of the
net assets.
All internal bookkeeping and accounting of the Pension
Companies and the Funds shall be done in accordance with
international accounting standards.
Conflicts of interest
The same legal or natural person may not be a share-
holder of more than three Pension Companies.
A member of the Board of Management or Supervisory
Board of a Pension Company cannot be a person who is a
member of a Board of Management or Supervisory Board of:
– any other Pension Company,
– any external asset manager, if appointed,
– the custodian holding the assets of the Fund,
– any person related to the Fund or the Company itself.
The Fund’s assets may not be invested in securities issued
by: shareholders of the governing Pension Company; the asset
manager if appointed; the custodian; any related persons.
The custodian
The Pension Company must appoint a custodian to keep
the Fund’s assets. A Company must appoint a single custo-
dian for all the assets of the Fund managed. A custodian may
act as such in relation to more than one Fund, but it must
keep the assets and records of each Fund strictly segregat-
ed from each other and from those of the custodian.
Bankruptcy aspects
A Fund may not be declared bankrupt.
Fund’s assets deposited and kept with a custodian may
not be subject to execution against the custodian and may
not be included in the bankruptcy estate of the custodian.
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6.5. The Case of Bulgaria*
Introduction
The currently operating pension system in Bulgaria is of
a Pay-As You-Go (PAYG) type. This means that the financ-
ing of the old age pensions, disability and industrial accidents
pensions, as well as survivor pensions, is done on the basis
of the insurance contributions made by the current work-
ers. The conditions for access to the pension system in Bul-
garia are not very strict – the retirement age is compara-
tively low, there are early retirement schemes and the
length of service required for retirement is already achieved
in the middle of one’s working career. At the same time, the
pension benefits are rather low – the average pension con-
stitutes about 1/3 of the average salary for the country. The
recently established private pension funds still cannot fulfill
their role of an alternative due to the fact that their func-
tioning is not yet regulated in a special law, while the low
incomes and the fear of financial pyramids refrain people
from jointing them.
Over the recent years a huge amount of social, political
and expert energy has been spent (including international
technical assistance) to prepare the White Book of Social
Security Reform, develop a new Pension Act and make
amendments in the existing pension legislation.  The major
flaw of these attempted reforms was that the solution of the
pension problem was sought only within the context of the
current pension system. There was no political will and
courage to undertake more radical reforms, incorporating a
change in the conditions for access to the pension system.
While looking for ways to adjust the pension benefits of the
retirees, the new pensioners, who relied only on the public
pension system, found themselves in the same miserable
condition.
For the first time the Bulgaria the 2001 Program of the
UDF proposed a new way for getting out of the wicked cir-
cle. The government of Bulgaria realised the need of radical
reforms and adopted the idea of establishing a three pillar
system based on the principle of security through diversity. 
It is the purpose of the reform to establish a three pillar
system:
– Public mandatory pension insurance system of a
PAYG type (first pillar). This pillar of the pension system
shall secure incomes to cover the larger part of the basic
needs of pensioners like food, housing, medication. The
PAYG system shall ensure a pension benefit equal to 40–45
per cent of the net salary prior to retirement.
– Supplementary mandatory pension insurance
(second pillar), based on mandatory defined contributions
accumulated into an individual account.  Each working per-
son shall have his own individual account where the
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employer and himself shall make mandatory contributions
that shall be exempt from taxes (respectively recognised as
operational expenditures). The means shall be kept with a
pension fund and invested by licensed private pension insur-
ance companies. The amount of the pension benefit shall
depend on the sum total of contributions, as increased with
the revenues from investment, and reduced with fees and
charges for the management of the pension fund. This pillar
of the pension system shall ensure a pension benefit equal to
15–20 per cent of the net salary prior to the moment of
retirement.  Naturally, the longer the worker has con-
tributed and the better the funds have been invested, the
higher the benefit shall be. The state regulation here is
extremely strict and includes also guarantees for a minimum
investment earning. 
– Supplementary voluntary pension insurance
(third pillar), based on voluntary pension contributions,
made by the worker or the employer in a voluntary pension
fund. One can participate in voluntary pension insurance
also with investment vouchers, and separate pension funds
are set up to this end.  The amount of the pension benefit is
determined in the same way as with the second pillar.  It is
expected that about 1/3rd of the economically active popu-
lation will participate in this option and their pension
incomes will depend on their individual contributions and
the social initiatives of their employers. This pillar is of an
investment savings type with the  ultimate objective of enti-
tlement to a pension. The difference with the normal type
of saving schemes or individual investment  is to be found in
the fact that part of the savings in the form of insurance con-
tributions are tax exempt or recognised as operational
expenditures. On the other hand, there is a strong govern-
ment regulation of the pension insurance companies’ activi-
ties, though at a more liberal regime that with the second
pillar. There are no guarantees here for minimum invest-
ment earnings and the risk is shared between the insured
persons and the pension insurance companies [10]. 
6.5.1. Key Issues of Pension Reform
Although most of the politicians support the establish-
ment of a three pillar system, there is still no consensus and
clarity as to the sequence and content of the reform. The
key issues that are still the subject of debate include:
– How to achieve a better differentiation in legal terms
between the pension insurance company and the pension
funds administered by in the Bulgarian legislative context?
– Should the pension insurance companies be given the
chance to administer more pension funds or restrict their
activities to the management of one cash pension fund and
one investment vouchers pension fund?
– What should be the structure of the pension funds
from the second pillar – should they be occupational funds
only, universal funds only or both types should exist side by
side?
– What should be the level of the mandatory contribu-
tions for supplementary mandatory pension insurance?
– How to avoid the problem of double taxation of the
current workers whereas they contribute first for the
benefits of the present pensioners, and second – for their
own pension benefits, in the conditions of a high insur-
ance burden?
6.5.2. Main features of the Supplementary Volun-
tary Pension Insurance Act
The proposed Bill will settle social relations in supple-
mentary voluntary pensions insurance through the introduc-
tion of  legal regulation of the activities of the existing com-
panies in the field of supplementary voluntary pension insur-
ance and the provision of conditions for its development.
The main objective of the Bill is to provide conditions
and opportunities for enhancement of the social protection
of the population through supplementary voluntary pension
insurance.
The additional objectives  of the Bill are:
– to encourage the savings of the population,
– to stimulate employers’ social initiatives,
– to promote the development of the securities markets
in the country,
– to intensify the social drive of privatisation,
– to integrate the Republic of Bulgaria in social Europe.
The Bill was developed on the basis of the following
major principles:
1) Voluntary participation,
2) Defined insurance contributions,
3) Insurance contribution sources: personal funds,
employer funds and investment bonds,
4) Capitalisation of insurance contributions,
5) Keeping an individual account for each participant,
6) Differentiating the participant from the shareholder
funds, including legal separation of the voluntary pension
fund from the pension insurance company,
7) Clear and easily understandable formulation of the
principal rights and obligations of the participants in SVPI,
including:
– their entitlement to old age, disability and survivor
pensions,
– their entitlement to a free choice among the "prod-
ucts" being offered: life pension benefits, pension benefits
for a certain period of time (in years), lump or rescheduled
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withdrawal of the moneys accrued in the accounts under
the terms and conditions regulated by the law,
– their entitlement to transfer the funds accrued in their
individual accounts from one SVPI Fund to another under
the terms and conditions regulated by the law,
8) Functional and effective government regulation and
oversight aimed at protecting the interests of the partici-
pants in SVPI,
9) A regime of licensing the administrative, actuarial and
investment services available to the voluntary pension funds
to pension insurance companies,
10) Government preferences and incentives for the
development of SVPI,
11) Regulation of the capital adequacy and liquidity of
the funds in the pension insurance companies,
12) Fair competition between SVPI companies,
13) Transparency in the pension insurance companies’
activities, and
14) Mandatory regular accountability before the partici-
pants concerning the activities of the Fund and the cash
flows in their personal accounts.
The following aspects of the Bill deserve special atten-
tion:
1) Primary focus on the protection of the interested of
the insured persons through clearly defined and legally reg-
ulated rules governing the activities in the field of SVPI;
stronger governmental control, separation of  borrowed
from equity funds, requirements for professionalism in the
management of borrowed funds, transparency in the activi-
ties of the pension insurance companies. 
2) Freedom of the insured to choose a pension insur-
ance company, pension  scheme and mode of participation,
their entitlement to dispose of their own money. The Bill
envisages some constraints upon these entitlements, espe-
cially for the cases when the insurance contributions are
made by the employer or are in the form of investment
vouchers.
3) Some specific rules are introduced for competent
borrowed funds management and achievement of higher
yields: a contract with an investment broker and deposito-
ry or independent management provided by the pension
insurance company on the ground of a special license. The
right to participation of foreign investors and the investment
of a limited part of borrowed funds outside the country
guarantee yields in the conditions of underdeveloped capi-
tal markets in the country.
4) A special regime of participation is regulated for SVPI
participation with investment vouchers and for their man-
agement through their differentiation in a separate pension
fund of investment vouchers. Owing to the dynamics of the
process of mass privatisation it is suggested that the specif-
ic forms and rules of participation of the pension insurance
companies in mass privatisation should be settled by decree
of the Council of Ministers.
5) A combination of fees and yield appropriations are
introduced towards the support of the pension insurance
companies. The proposed fees in the form of % of the con-
tributions are aimed to guarantee fixed revenues for the
support of the activities of pension insurance companies
regardless of the investment climate in the country. The
second source of revenues to support their operations will
be appropriations of up to 10% of the yields obtained from
the investment of the moneys of the pension fund with a
view to the more efficient management of investments
ensuring uniformity in the interests of the parties to the
insurance contract. The envisaged options for additional
fees in connection with funds withdrawal and transfer in the
order prescribed by the law or the requirement for infor-
mation outside the legal prescriptions seek greater stability
in the system and coverage of the extraordinary expendi-
tures of the pension insurance companies.
6) The tax preferences indicated in the Bill are aimed at
stimulating the participation in SVPI. Their specific amount
will be defined in the relevant tax laws.
7) Special status and larger powers of the government
supervisory agency combined with high professional perfor-
mance requirements for its staff members; universal scope
and uniform government supervision (through a unified
agency) over the different forms of supplementary social
insurance - pension, health and unemployment. Co-ordina-
tion of its operations with the competent government
authorities: the Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, the
Commission for Securities and Stock Exchange, the Bulgar-
ian National Bank and the Insurance Supervision Direc-
torate.
In the drafting of this Bill account has been taken of the
principal ideas of the reform in the field of social insurance:
transformation of mandatory social security (the first pillar);
development of mandatory supplementary insurance (sec-
ond pillar) and development of supplementary voluntary
insurance (third pillar) in Bulgaria.
6.6. The case of Lithuania*
Introduction 
In Lithuania, as in other post-Soviet countries, the cre-
ation of an independent state was associated with the rapid
formation of new national institutions, including social secu-
rity system institutions. Initially, pensions were treated like
other social benefits paid from the state budget. As early as
1991, the social insurance fund was separated; later on pen-
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sion benefits became more actuarial in character, related to
both the lengh and amount of contributions.
Pension reform in Lithuania was implemented in three
main phases:
1) Separation of the social insurance fund from the
national budget in 1991. The previous system, inherited
from the Soviet regime, was not operating as financially
independent. The separation from the budget made it pos-
sible to create the fund, which is administered by a tripartite
council, representing employers’ organisations, trade unions
and the government.
2) Arrangement of the public pension system in
1995, enacted through the Law on State Social Insur-
ance Pensions. Before this reform Lithuania operated vir-
tually a flat pension system. The new law replaced pension
eligibility criteria and pension formulae and raised the retire-
ment age. This regulation resembles reforms applied in
other countries Central and Eastern Europe, that put put
their public systems in order.
3) Introduction of the supplementary pension pillar
through the Pension Funds Act in 1999. The law
enables people to join the private pension fund on a volun-
tary basis.
In this section the main supervisory instruments relat-
ing to pension fund activities are presented. Since it is too
early to study the results of pension funds, the analysis is
based on solutions that were prescribed in the Law on
Pension Funds.
6.6.1. Licensing of Pension Funds
Pension funds may be established as joint stock compa-
nies in a closed manner. This means that the first issue of a
pension fund’s shares may not be distributed publicly. Only
the founders of a pension fund have a right to acquire them.
This measure is intended to facilitate the examination of
founders-shareholders’ reputation and readiness to start
pension fund activity before a license is issued.
A pension fund must obtain an official permit to start
activity. Pension contributions may not be collected until
such a permit has been obtained and a pension programme
has been co-ordinated and registered with relevant regula-
tory institutions. 
A permit to start a pension fund may be granted only to
entities operating or established in accordance with the Law
on Pension Funds. The main requirements are:
– equity capital of no less than four million litas (one mil-
lion US dollars),
– readiness to start a pension fund in terms of facilities
and qualifications (also founders’ reputation),
– appropriate by-laws,
– a pension programme approved by supervisory institu-
tions (the Securities Commission and the Ministry of Social
Welfare and Labour),
– a three-year business plan,
– an appropriate depository, and
– an appropriate management company in case of out-
sourcing.
If pension fund activity is launched by an operating com-
pany, the Securities Commission also examines the last
year’s audited financial statements. Applicants are required
to submit information about their selected depository and
management company, if any. The Securities Commission
has a right to require the submission of additional docu-
ments if such are necessary to adopt a decision regarding
the issue of a permit.
A permit to start a pension fund must be issued dur-
ing three months. A permit is not issued if the applicant
fails to meet established requirements concerning docu-
ments and authorised capital. Borrowed funds may not
be used to pay for authorised capital. In-kind contribu-
tions may not comprise more than 20 percent of autho-
rised capital. 
The supervisory authority may use licensing procedures
to influence activity of pension funds at later stages of oper-
ation. If a pension fund violates the law or the interests of
the insured, the supervisory institution may restrict the pen-
sion fund’s activity or assign an administrator to oversee its
operation for a period of no more than three months. Dur-
ing this period, a decision must be made whether to lift the
restrictions or revoke the licence. There is a belief that a
three-month period may be too short for a pension fund to
ameliorate its situation. There is a danger that a licence may
be revoked, and a pension fund liquidated, to the disadvan-
tage of its members.
A permit to perform pension fund activity is revoked if a
pension fund violates the law or fails to discharge liabilities
towards its members, to rectify identified defects or to
launch activity during a period of one year.
New licensing procedures are applied after a pension
fund has been reorganised.
6.6.2. Regulation of Documents Related to Pen-
sion Funds
The law regulates the content of pension funds’ by-laws.
In addition to general requirements applicable to all joint
stock companies, specific requirements are imposed on the
formulation of pension programmes, distribution of invest-
ment income, and information disclosure to members of
pension funds. Internal by-laws may be replaced only with
the consent of the supervisory authority. Pension funds must
obtain a permit from the Securities Commission to establish
subsidiaries. 
The Law on Pension Funds allows the establishment of
both open-end and closed-end pension funds. The latter
must stipulate certain participation restrictions in their pen-
sion programmes. 
CASE Reports No. 36
61
Rational Pension Supervision
Pension fund activity is organised based on pension pro-
grammes. Pension programmes may vary by investment
strategies, payment of contributions, and other participa-
tion conditions. The content of pension programmes is reg-
ulated by law. Pension programmes must be approved by
the Securities Commission and the Ministry of Social Wel-
fare and Labour plus registered with the former. Changes to
pension programmes enter into force upon the approval of
the Securities Commission. 
A pension fund must conclude pension agreements with
each payer of contributions. Payers of contributions may be
members of the fund or other persons who will contribute
on behalf of them. The Securities Commission, together
with the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labour, establishes
necessary terms of pension contracts. Pension funds have
no right to terminate a pension agreement without the con-
sent of the member, but members are allowed to do so.
Breaches of the terms of payments of pension contributions
may not serve as a basis for terminating a pension contract.
Concurrent payment of contribution and receipt of benefits
under the same pension programme are prohibited.
If contributions are to be paid by the employer on behalf
of the employee, the employee may indicate a pension fund
with which to conclude a pension contract. The employer
may not shift onto the employee his obligation to pay pen-
sion contributions. An employee may volunteer to pay con-
tributions under a contract signed by the employer.
A pension fund must keep a register of all members in
accordance with rules prescribed by the Securities Com-
mission.
Members of the pension funds may switch to another
programme or another fund without incurring any sanctions
a year. In case of repeated transfers, the pension fund to be
quitted may charge a fee. If a member withdraws his savings
before the retirement age without transferring them to
another pension fund, sanctions are imposed: the pension
fund must deduct either investment income accrued over
the past three years or five percent of the sum withdrawn,
whichever is bigger. The money received from sanctions is
apportioned between other pension fund members. 
The retirement age is defined in pension programmes. It
may not be lower than the official retirement age by more
than five years. Exemptions are applied to disabled individ-
uals who may receive benefits as of the date when the dis-
ability was recognised. When a person reaches the retire-
ment age, he is under no obligation to terminate accrual of
funds or to withdraw his benefits. 
The law defines possible types of benefits. These are
benefits payable from personal accounts or a benefit
payable for the purchase of an annuity in an insurance com-
pany. Pension funds are not allowed to pay annuities. Cer-
tain limits are imposed on the size of pension instalments
payable from personal accounts for members who are not
eligible for pensions provided by the state. A member who
did not purchase an annuity instantly has a right to do so for
the sum remaining later on. 
6.6.3. Regulation of Financial Activity and Invest-
ment
Pension funds are not allowed to carry out any activity
unrelated to pension fund activity. 
Pension accounts belong to pension fund members by
the right of ownership. Pension accounts may be inherited.
Pension contributions made by a third party on behalf of a
pension fund member become the member’s sole property
as of the moment these contributions are received by the
fund. Pension accounts may not be used to make disburse-
ments not defined by the law.
The assets of members are financially segregated from
the pension fund’s own assets. Given that accrual of pension
funds is administered under distinct programmes, the assets
of these programmes are segregated as well. 
To prevent creditors’ claims to pension assets, pension
funds are not allowed to extend loans, to guarantee with, or
to mortgage, its assets, except when a pension fund takes a
short-term loan guaranteed with its assets to maintain liq-
uidity. Pension funds may not borrow for any other purpos-
es. Pension funds are not allowed to be founders of compa-
nies or to issue bonds.
Pension funds must assume an obligation in their pension
programmes to provide a certain level of investment return
for their members. Pension  funds are allowed to set the
minimum level of investment return themselves. This level
may not be lowered later on. To be able to discharge its lia-
bilities, a pension fund must form a guarantee reserve fund.
The procedures of forming the fund are defined by the
Securities Commission. If investment income and guarantee
reserves are lacking for a pension fund to discharge all its lia-
bilities, equity capital must be used.
The law stipulates requirements for the apportionment
of investment income. Investment income is used in the first
place to discharge liabilities arising from pension pro-
grammes. The remaining funds are apportioned as follows:
80 percent is distributed among pension fund members, and
20 percent goes for the pension fund. 
Each pension programme must define the procedures
for covering administrative costs. No limits are imposed on
administrative expenses. Profits generated by pension funds
may not be used to pay bonuses and dividends if capital ade-
quacy, equity capital and reserves appear to be lower than
required by law or the Securities Commission. 
Pension funds are subject to a capital adequacy require-
ment which is intended to ensure sufficient reserves calcu-
lated based on investment risk for a pension fund to dis-
charge all its liabilities (first of all, profitability of pension
programmes). Yet, this requirement does not secure an
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adequate ratio of equity capital to assets managed. It may be
acceptable to replace the capital adequacy requirement with
a certain ratio of equity capital and assets under management.
Other requirements applicable to pension funds include
liquidity ratio and the maximum open position in foreign
currency. The usefulness of the liquidity requirement is
questionable given that pension funds will not pay pensions
themselves. The maximum open position in foreign curren-
cies will restrict investments abroad. The latter may not
prove the best way to protect members’ interests given that
investments abroad may accommodate better diversifica-
tion and investment safety.
Pension funds are allowed to hire management compa-
nies to administer their investments or the whole of their
activity. The general meeting of shareholders must approve
agreements with management companies. Management
companies may not be replaced without the Securities
Commission’s consent. Management companies must com-
pensate for the harm incurred by pension funds through
their fault. 
Special requirements are applied to management com-
panies. Management companies must obtain a permit from
the Securities Commission. Only specialised institutions can
act as management companies, because in order to comply
with EU requirements they are prohibited from performing
any other activity. This may partly be explained by the fact
that performance of pension fund management by operating
financial institutions (banks, insurance companies) would
complicate their supervision. 
A management company may be related to the pension
fund, but the depository must be independent. A pension
fund may not be related to its management company and
depository through employees. The same people may not
hold top positions in a pension fund and its management
company or depository.
Investment restrictions 
Investment regulations follow the listing rather than the
"prudent man" rule. They define allowable investments and
investment limits. Investment portfolios may comprise secu-
rities, real estate, deposits in commercial banks, and deposit
certificates issued by banks. 
The requirements for investment portfolio diversifica-
tion comply with international standards: pension funds may
not acquire more than 10 percent of securities of one issuer
and investments into one issuer or one property item may
not exceed 5 percent of pension assets. These restrictions
are not applied to government securities. Here, no manda-
tory minimum levels are prescribed. 
The law defines types of securities into which pension
funds may invest. These are treasury bills, issues quoted on
the Official List of the National Stock Exchange of Lithuania,
plus other liquid securities recognised by the Securities
Commission. The same diversification requirements are
applicable to investments abroad. No limitations are
imposed on the amount of investments abroad. Yet, the
law prescribes the maximum open position in foreign cur-
rencies. The concept of sponsorship? is not stipulated in
the law.
Pension funds are prohibited from investing into their
own securities or securities issued by other pension funds. 
Investments into real estate may not exceed 20 percent
of pension assets. Not more than 25 percent of pension
assets may be invested into related persons. The Securities
Commission has a right to impose additional restrictions on
investments into securities or deposits in commercial banks. 
Given that the assets of each pension programme are
administered separately, each pension programme is subject
to distinct diversification and other requirements. The equi-
ty capital must be invested into a diversified portfolio, which
is subject to the same investment requirements as mem-
bers’ assets.
6.6.4. Regulation of the Safekeeping of Assets 
All assets belonging to pension fund members must be
transferred to a depository for safekeeping. A depository
must be an independent institution not related to the pen-
sion fund or its management company. The Securities Com-
mission may impose requirements on a pension fund’s
depository in addition to those stipulated by the law gov-
erning depositories. The assets transferred to a depository
for safekeeping must be segregated from the depository’s
own assets. The assets of distinct pension programmes must
be administered separately.
The depository not only safeguards pension assets, but
also examines whether transactions with the pension fund
comply with the law, the pension fund’s by-laws, and pro-
gramme requirements. The depository is liable for damages
to the pension fund.
A pension fund may make the decision to be liquidated
provided it has transferred all its liabilities to other pension
funds and provided the latter does not worsen programme
conditions. If the license has been revoked, a decision to liq-
uidate a pension fund may also be adopted by the Securities
Commission. In such cases the Securities Commission
assigns a liquidator. If a pension fund is liquidated by the deci-
sion of the Securities Commission, all assets of pension fund
members must be taken over by other pension funds. The
remaining assets are sold and apportioned between share-
holders. 
If a pension fund is to be reorganised, it must obtain
approval for the reorganisation project from the Securities
Commission and the Ministry of Social Welfare and Labour.
If a pension fund is being liquidated or reorganised, or a
pension programme is terminated, the pension fund may
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transfer its liabilities without members’ consent provided
participation conditions are not worsened and the supervi-
sory authority has granted its consent. Members who are
dissatisfied with such decisions have a right to switch the
new programme free of charge. 
Since the pension fund’s and members’ assets are segre-
gated and the money held in pension accounts belongs to
the members by the right of ownership, this money, in the
event of the pension fund’s bankruptcy, is returned to the
members before creditors’ claims are satisfied. If money is
lacking to discharge all liabilities, the pension fund covers
the shortfall with its equity capital. As soon as bankruptcy
proceedings are instituted, all operations of the pension
fund are suspended, except for accrual of investment
income and other operations necessary to proceed with liq-
uidation.
6.6.5. Management and Responsibility
Since the Law on Pension Funds is based on the Law on
Joint Stock Companies, the establishment of a council and
board of pension funds, as well as the definition of their
powers and responsibilities, is regulated by the Law on
Joint Stock Companies. Definition of the establishment
and competence of managing bodies is also required in
pension fund by-laws. 
The Securities Commission has a right to require a
pension fund to convene an extraordinary meeting of
shareholders.
Pension funds as well as their management companies
and depositories must act in the best interest of the pen-
sion fund members. Members of the council and board as
well as top managers have a joint liability for compliance
with statutory provisions and performance of the duty to
act in the best interest of the members of pension fund.
They must compensate the pension fund for damages
incurred through failure to perform the said duties. This
may also be a basis for the supervisory authority to inter-
vene and impose sanctions.
An independent audit of a pension fund is mandatory
after each business year. The terms of an audit contract
must be co-ordinated with the Securities Commission.
Pension funds may also set up temporary controlling com-
missions.
6.6.6. Information Disclosure 
Only a company established under the Law on Pension
Funds and conducting pension fund activity has a right to use
the words "pension fund" in its name.
A pension programme is the main document regulating
participation conditions. Before signing a pension contract,
each member must be familiarised with the pension pro-
gramme, which constitutes part of the contract. If a pro-
gramme is being replaced, each member and payer of con-
tributions must be notified in writing about the changes no
later than 30 days before these changes come into effect.
The pension fund must notify its members about non-
compliance with the payment of pension contributions if
these are paid by third parties. 
The Securities Commission must announce informa-
tion about reorganisation or liquidation of pension funds
according to established rules so that this information
would reach every member and payer of pension contri-
butions. In addition, every interested person has a right to
receive from the pension fund information about the
process of reorganisation. Members of the pension fund
and the Securities Commission must be notified about the
pension fund’s decision to terminate a pension programme
within five working days. 
The law provides for periodic financial accountability:
each year’s audited reports plus semi-annual reports must
be submitted to the Securities Commission and announced
publicly. Members of pension funds are allowed to receive
copies of these documents on demand. Pension funds are
required to notify their members in writing at least once a
year about the their account statements, about changes to
legal acts relating to pension funds, depositories and man-
agement companies, and about changes regarding deposito-
ries and management companies. Pension programmes
define the content of such notices. It is our opinion that the
periodicity of reports about account statements should be
increased over time.
Management companies are also required to submit
financial reports to the Securities Commission according to
its established procedures.
6.6.7. The Powers of the Supervisory Authority
Lithuania has opted for an operating non-specialised
supervisory institution of pension funds. Pension supervi-
sion will be delegated to the Securities Commission,
which supervises the capital market. This option has
been prompted by the fact that pension funds will be sav-
ings institutions similar to investment funds and will rep-
resent a voluntary supplement to the existing public pen-
sion system. The Securities Commission will have a right
to inspect pension funds, to issue mandatory instructions
and to impose sanctions.
The Ministry of Social Welfare and Labour will oversee
the formulation of pension programmes, their compliance
with collective agreements, the discharging of employers’
liabilities to pay pension contributions, and the application
of restrictions on the payment of benefits from pension
accounts.
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The development of pension funds as private financial
institutions that invest savings for future pensions is being
effected by a great variety of means. This is apparent not
only in Western countries with a rich tradition of market
solutions in many areas of the economy and social relations,
but also in Central and Eastern European countries that
started from the same position, one might think, when they
gave up a centrally planned economy and started to build a
market economy.
The varied paths leading to to the development of pen-
sion funds means that supervision over them takes different
forms as well. Experience shows there is no universal recipe
for proper supervision.
One must ask why supervision is necessary at all, and
what proper supervision entails. As has been mentioned
previously (see Chapter 2), the development of pension
funds during the first historical period of their establishment
took place more or less without any outside supervision.
Today, though, both newly established institutions and old
ones are under supervision. Why is this so?
It seems there are two basic causes that combine to
strengthen the arguments in favour of supervision.
Firstly, the share of the pensioner population’s income
from saving in pension funds is growing, regardless of
whether participation in the funds is compulsory or not.
This population will grow because Western societies are
ageing dynamically. A pension from a pension fund will not
be (and in many countries already is not) just a marginal
solution for the wealthier group of the senior population,
but an increasingly widespread way of securing income for
old age. The safe and effective functioning of the funds will
thus be an important criterion of trust in the State, the eco-
nomic system and its institutions.
Secondly, contemporary market economies are not free
of crises, especially financial ones. Many individual institu-
tions and whole groups fall victim to weak (short-sighted)
regulations and bad management, as well as fraud. The
economies of countries who practised central planning until
recently, possessing little market experience and a huge
deficit of regulations adapted to the new system’s logic, are
especially susceptible to crisis. At the same time, the crisis
of any market institution in any country can cause a great
loss of trust among society in general. Change, meanwhile,
requires motivation and positive examples to stimulate
people to private activity and participation in market solu-
tions. That is why financial institutions, thanks to which the
average citizen gains market experience, should be
extremely solid.
To decide what proper supervision means, one has to
understand that the financial risk linked to pension funds is
an element of the overall risk found in the financial system.
The existence of risk, as a "natural" component of that sys-
tem, has to be calculated into both regulation and supervi-
sion [11]. This paper has attempted to provide a detailed
analysis of risks and, furthermore, even to rank them. How-
ever, it is impossible to say unequivocally what kind of
supervision is proper. Let us try, nevertheless, based on an
analysis of different countries’ experiences, to show certain
conditions and qualities for the proper supervision of pen-
sion funds.
– The first condition involves the necessity of complying
simultaneously with safety criteria and effectiveness criteria.
Due to the great importance of this for pension funds, a sep-
arate supervisory body is created for them. When the
supervisory body is common for different types of financial
activity and covers an excessively large part of the financial
market (e.g. the banking or insurance system, or the whole
financial market as in the United Kingdom), the trend to dis-
regard the interests of fund members can occur more fre-
quently. Where this happens, supervision identifies with the
interests of the pension fund industry as a part of the sector
undergoing supervision rather than defending future pen-
sioners against excessive financial risk (this is called "supervi-
sory capture"). Common supervision leads to a situation
where, in the course of time, specialist analytical institutions
are separated out, and this reduces the danger of domina-
tion of the sector’s interests over its clients. Thus, institu-
tional unity is not maintained. Admittedly, establishing a sep-
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arate supervisory body just for pension funds does not solve
the problems involved with balancing the criteria. What is
needed is a supervisory body that would have extensive
competence in both financial supervision and legal supervi-
sion. In practice, achieving such harmony of competence is
not simple. Supervision employees would have to have the
same financial qualifications as those who manage the
funds. Since supervisory bodies are usually government
agencies that are unable to compete with commercial (pri-
vate) companies for employees highly qualified in finance,
supervision over pension funds is entrusted to bodies that
supervise the stock exchange, banks or insurance compa-
nies. However, if there is a separate supervisory body, as is
the practice in the model-creating countries of South
America (Chile, Argentina) and subsequently adopted by
Hungary and Poland, the problem arises of obtaining and
paying the best experts for such a body. They would have
to earn about the same as members of the pension fund
management board – and these are high salaries, far higher
than government administration salaries. In supervisory
bodies that are government agencies, drastic salary differ-
ences between government administration employees are
very hard to accept, and practically impossible to imple-
ment, though the example of Argentina seems to show that
this is in fact possible (salaries in supervision are 50% high-
er than in the management boards of the best funds). Let
us not forget, however, that Argentina’s Superintendecia is
a largely autonomous institution.
– The second condition relates to the independence of
the supervisory body. The issue here is independence in a
broad sense, both from political influences and the influence
of the funds themselves, as well as other pressure groups.
Due to the growing share of assets in the funds, which is
turning them into a serious financial force, they are increas-
ingly becoming the object of pressure and political coquetry
that occasionally has serious consequences on their effec-
tiveness. Independence from political influences can be
achieved by the proper placement of the supervisory body
and well-defined methods for choosing its head, with the
participation of parliament to ensure its functional stability
in the longer term. One important element of such a body’s
independence is to ensure it has independent financing. The
source of funding should be commission from the funds
rather than an annual state budget subsidy. Budget financing
makes it difficult to use aggressive salary motivation for
employees of the supervisory body (see above), which in
turn is a condition for attracting highly qualified people in
the financial field to supervise pension funds.
– Independent supervisory bodies should have the right
to submit drafts of changes in the regulations or of addi-
tional regulations on the operation of pension funds. They
should also provide opinions on draft regulations proposed
by others. This right is especially important in countries with
little experience in regulating the financial sector – in the
countries undergoing transition. The supervisory body is
quickly becoming one of the most competent institutions in
the sector, and while it should maintain its independence, its
voice should be ensured the proper rank in initiating new
regulations. This does not mean, though, that the supervi-
sory body should be created as the fundamental regulatory
institution (in accordance with the active supervision
model). Its initial assets in improving the regulation of the
pension fund sector could be transformed into the defects
of a leading decelerating force, weakening the market adap-
tation of the funds themselves and their capacity for self-
regulation.
– With supervisory bodies in countries where participa-
tion in pension funds is obligatory for a certain group or for
the whole population, and where the pension from the
fund de facto becomes a component of social security,
supervision should be developed along stricter and more
draconian lines. It needs to be exercised exceptionally
scrupulously, even though there are other safeguards in
such cases (e.g. a defined investment structure and invest-
ment limits, a minimum rate of return, a guarantee fund).
In the case of pension funds operating on the basis of vol-
untary participation and greater freedom of choice regard-
ing not just the fund but also the investment options, a dis-
tanced form of supervision (within reactive supervision) is
permissible. The "prudent man" concept  forms the basis
for this type of supervision.
– Institutions exercising supervision of pension funds
should be legally obligated to co-operate with other super-
visory bodies and regulatory bodies. The obligation of co-
operation should also concern the public part of the pension
sector. In the countries undergoing transition, it is as yet dif-
ficult to achieve this kind of co-operation. Had it existed, it
would have allowed several risks that became apparent at
the start of the pension funds’ functioning to be avoided.
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A-1. The case of Hungary: Act on Private
Pensions and Private Pension Funds 
(Act LXXXII of 1997) [fragments]
Chapter XI. State Guarantees, State Supervision
of Funds
Section 100.
The State shall secure the operation of the private pen-
sion system by enforcing the rules of institutional protec-
tion, by maintaining state supervision and by assuming finan-
cial guarantees from the central budget for the solvency of
the Guarantee Fund, which guarantees the payment of the
fund members' claims.
Section 101.
Legal supervision of the funds shall be carried out by the
General Prosecutor's office in compliance with the relevant
governing rules, and state supervision shall be carried out by
the Minister of Finance through the Private Fund Superviso-
ry Board.
Legal Status and Scope of Responsibility of the
Private Fund Supervisory Board
Section 102.
1. The Private Fund Supervisory Board is a national,
administrative organisation in the first instance operating as
an independent central office under the supervision of the
Minister of Finance.
2. The Private Fund Supervisory Board is a legal entity
and operates as an organisation funded by the central bud-
get, with semi-independent finances. The Fund Regulations
of the Private Fund Supervisory Board shall be approved by
the Minister of Finance. The registered office of the Private
Fund Supervisory Board is in Budapest.
3. The authority of the Private Fund Supervisory Board
includes the supervision of the activities of organisations
specified in Section 2 of this Act, as well as tasks and author-
ity specified by VMIFA.
4. The Private Fund Supervisory Board shall act in com-
pliance with SAPR with due regard to the provisions listed
in this Act.
5. Appeals against the resolution of the Private Fund
Supervisory Board may be submitted to the Minister of
Finance.
6. The Private Fund Supervisory Board has the right in
the preparation phase to examine legal regulations related
to the system of social security, mandatory and voluntary
pension funds, and to make recommendations on the for-
mulation of relevant legal regulations and the amendments
thereof.
7. The Private Fund Supervisory Board may sign
agreements of co-operation, may exchange information
which is not classified as personal data with foreign
supervisory authorities or international organisations
established by such authorities, and may join such organ-
isations as a member. The Private Fund Supervisory
Board may utilise data and information received from
foreign supervisory authorities to improve its perfor-
mance, as well as to have a better basis to judge applica-
tions, pass resolutions, take measures or impose sanc-
tions. The Private Fund Supervisory Board may disclose
data and other information to the above mentioned
organisations for the same purposes, within the frame-
work of international co-operation.
8. The Private Fund Supervisory Board shall officially
publish its resolutions and opinions in the "Financial
Gazette".
Section 103.
1. Any person who serves or served in a civil service
capacity, other work-related, or commissioned legal rela-
tionship with the Private Fund Supervisory Board, shall
maintain business and fund secrets related to the activities
of the funds which are/were disclosed to him while carrying
out supervisory tasks. Secrecy shall be maintained without
any limitation in time, even after the termination of the legal
relationship with the Private Fund Supervisory Board.
2. Any such person as referred to in Subsection 1. shall
not use business or fund secrets disclosed to him to gain
advantage for himself or for any other person directly or
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indirectly through such secrets, nor to cause any detriment
to the fund or fund members.
Power of Appointment
President of the Private Fund Supervisory Board
Section 104.
1. The President of the Private Fund Supervisory Board
shall be appointed for a term of six years, and the vice-pres-
ident(s) for an indefinite period, by the Minister of Finance,
who shall also exercise the employer's rights over the Pres-
ident and the vice-president(s).
2. The status of the President, vice-president(s) and
employees of the Private Fund Supervisory Board shall be
governed by the provisions of CSA, with respect to the pro-
visions of this Act, with the exception that the rates set out
in Subsection 3. of Section 30/A, Paragraph b) of Subsection
5. of Section 42 and Subsection 1. of Section 44 of CSA may
be increased to the extent specified by legal regulations per-
taining to the ministries.
3. The President and the vice-president(s) of the Private
Fund Supervisory Board shall be Hungarian citizens with no
prior criminal record, a higher education in the field, and at
least five years of management experience in the field of
finance, business, or public administration. The Minister of
Finance may grant a two year exemption from the five-year
experience requirement; furthermore, the Minister of
finance may also grant an exemption from the requirement
that the higher education degree be in the field, provided
that the candidate has had five years experience in the field.
4. As regards the appointment of the actuary of the Pri-
vate Fund Supervisory Board, the provisions of Subsections
2-4 of Section 47 of this Act shall apply.
5. The appointment of the President and the vice-presi-
dent of the Private Fund Supervisory Board shall be termi-
nated through discharge if:
a) according to a final judgement of the court they have
committed a crime, or have become unworthy of their
positions in any other way,
b) they have permanently become unable to fulfil their
functions,
c) they have not eliminated conflicts of interest with
their functions.
6. The President of the Private Fund Supervisory Board shall
a) represent the Private Fund Supervisory Board in
Hungary and abroad;
b) manage the activities of the Private Fund Supervisory
Board;
c) exercise the employer's rights over the employees of
the Private Fund Supervisory Board, and make recommen-
dations on exercising employer's rights related to the vice-
president(s);
d) exercise rights related to the financial management of
the Private Fund Supervisory Board;
e) order measures and impose penalties;
f) exercise all rights vested in him by the Fund Regula-
tions of Private Fund Supervisory Board pursuant to this
Act.
7. The President of the Private Fund Supervisory Board
may transfer his powers specified in Paragraphs c)-e) of
Subsection 6. with the exception of the right to make rec-
ommendations on exercising employers rights related to
the vice-president(s).
Conflict of Interest
Section 105.
1. The President, vice-president(s) and civil servants of
the Private Fund Supervisory Board shall not be in an
employment relationship, in any legal relationship with the
purpose of work, in a membership relationship in terms of
a corporation or partnership involving personal contribu-
tion, or ownership relationship with any fund, legal entity in
contractual relationship with that fund, the Guarantee Fund,
or any organisation involved in social security activities. The
said persons may not be senior officers of or members of
any organisation entrusted with the supervision thereof.
2. The President, the vice-president(s) and the civil ser-
vants of the Private Fund Supervisory Board, and the per-
sons listed in the Subsection 1 shall not be close relatives of
each other, and shall not act in issues in which they or their
close relatives have interest.
3. Persons specified in Subsection 1 shall immediately
notify the person exercising the employer's right of the exis-
tence of conflicts of interest specified in Subsections 1 and
2 and eliminate any conflict of interest as specified in Sub-
section 1 with immediate effect. The party exercising
employer's rights may require the person concerned to
eliminate such conflict of interest, even if he fails to fulfill the
requirement of notification. If the persons concerned fail to
eliminate such a conflict of interest, the civil servant status
of such persons shall be terminated by the Private Fund
Supervisory Board. In the event of conflicts of interest spec-
ified in Subsection 2, the party exercising employer's rights
shall decide whether or not the cause of conflict of interest
shall be eliminated, and whether the person notifying the
Board is entitled to act in the given circumstance.
Responsibilities of the Private Fund Supervisory
Board
Section 106.
1. The Private Fund Supervisory Board shall:
a) supervise compliance with the provisions of the law
and the legal regulations issued on the basis of authorisation
conferred by the law;
b) evaluate applications for licenses, and ensure that the
funds operate in compliance with such licenses;
c) appoint a Supervising Commissioner in the events
specified in this Act;
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d) co-operate in discovering and eliminating obstacles
which hamper the development of the funds and the Guar-
antee Fund, in co-ordinating the co-operation of the above
with the social security bodies;
e) operate an auditing and information system;
f) determine, in advance, on an annual basis, the expect-
ed and minimum return requirement on the funds' invest-
ments with a method of calculation specified by law;
g) approve the regulations of the funds.
2. The Private Fund Supervisory Board shall permanent-
ly make the following documents and data of the funds avail-
able to anyone interested, free of charge:
a) deed of foundation,
b) Fund Regulations,
c) benefit regulations,
d) minutes and resolutions of the General Meetings,
e) registered office, site(s), branch(es), affiliate(s),
f) tax number,
g) the assets of the fund,
h) names, addresses and positions of the authorised rep-
resentatives,
i) mode of representation,
j) names and addresses of senior officers,
k) name and address of the auditor,
l) annual reports.
3. The Private Fund Supervisory Board shall fulfill its
tasks related to the voluntary mutual interest funds in com-
pliance with a separate law.
Section 107.
1. In fulfilling its tasks, the Private Fund Supervisory
Board shall have the right to issue licenses, exercise control,
take measures and impose penalties.
2. While exercising its rights, the Private Fund Supervi-
sory Board shall not compel the fund to carry out financial
management other than approved in the Fund Regulations
and in the financial plan, unless the fund is temporarily insol-
vent.
Licensing Authority
Section 108.
The license of the Private Fund Supervisory Board shall
be obtained:
a) to establish a fund;
b) to start the fund's operation;
c) to implement the benefit regulations, and to start the
provision of fund services.
Right of the Private Fund Supervisory Board to Control,
Take Measures and Impose Penalties.
Section 109.
1. The Private Fund Supervisory Board shall have the
right at all times and an obligation to monitor every second
year whether the activities performed by the fund are in
compliance with the law and other legal regulations related
to the fund activities, the licenses granted by the Private
Fund Supervisory Board and the safety of the fund mem-
bers. To this effect, the Private Fund Supervisory Board shall
have the right to require the production of data, reports,
statements and inspection materials related to the perfor-
mance of the fund, or which are necessary to carry out the
audit, and to examine these documents on site, even with-
out prior notice, as well as to request reports.
2. The Private Fund Supervisory Board shall operate an
information system through which it can be connected
directly to the information system of the funds and the
Guarantee Fund. The detailed rules pertaining to the com-
mon information database shall be determined by the Gov-
ernment in the form of a decree.
3. In order to carry out the supervisory tasks specified in
Subsection (1), the Private Fund Supervisory Board may
send an employee, an independent auditor or other experts
to the fund to carry out a general or specific audit, as well as
to enforce the fund's reporting and accounting obligations.
Section 110.
1. For the purpose of the fulfillment of the obligations of
the fund, the protection of fund members' interests, as well
as the implementation of the relevant legal regulations, the
Private Fund Supervisory Board may take the following
measures:
a) it may issue a notice, and set the deadline, if required,
for the full implementation of provisions specified in this Act
and in other legal regulations relating to the activities of
funds;
b) it may require the submission of an action plan by a
given deadline, and may also set a deadline for the imple-
mentation of such an action plan;
c) it may initiate accountability or discharge proceedings
in respect of the manager concerned;
d) it may convene the meeting of the Board of Directors;
e) it may convene an extraordinary General Meeting;
f) it may impose a supervision penalty;
g) it may withdraw the operational license granted for
fund activities and, in this case or in the case of voluntary
dissolution, it may temporarily order that the fund members
pay their membership contributions to the Guarantee Fund;
it shall ensure, by the designation of the appropriate fund,
that fund members may become members of the designat-
ed fund within sixty days at the latest;
h) it may initiate the revision of the financial plan, and the
modification of the Fund Regulations;
i) it may initiate legal proceedings in court to liquidate
the fund;
j) it may appoint a Supervising Commissioner;
k) it may suspend the admission of fund members;
l) it may suspend the operation of the fund while con-
currently appointing a Supervising Commissioner, and may
suspend the admission of fund members.
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2. The operational license may be withdrawn if:
a) the fund fails to start operating within 180 days of the
date the license takes effect, or if it suspends operation
without the approval of the Private Fund Supervisory Board;
b) the fund has disclosed false information or statements
in the application for license, and, upon notice, fails to modi-
fy the information or statements accordingly within thirty
days;
c) the fund fails to meet the requirements specified in
the license;
d) the fund seriously breaches the provisions of legal
regulations related to fund activities, or does not comply
with the resolutions of the Private Fund Supervisory Board,
and therefore seriously jeopardises the interests of fund
members;
e) the fund is involved in activities other than those for
which it is licensed;
f) the conditions for the issuance of the license are no
longer fulfilled, and remedy of this situation is not possible
within an appropriate period of time.
Section 111.
1. The Private Fund Supervisory Board may impose
penalties on any members of the Board of Directors or the
Private Fund Supervisory Board who violate the Fund Reg-
ulations, are involved in activities which are contradictory to
the Fund Regulations, operate a fund without an operational
license, or fail to abide by measures taken or resolutions
passed by the Private Fund Supervisory Board. The amount
of the penalty may range from HUF 100,000 to HUF
1,000,000. The payment of the penalty shall not be assumed
by the fund.
2. The Private Fund Supervisory Board may impose
penalties on the fund if the fund does not change any unlaw-
ful practices or practices violating the Fund Regulations, or
violates the relevant accounting and financial requirements.
The upper limit of the penalty shall be 0.3 per cent of the
annual membership contributions, and may be imposed
repeatedly. If the fund deviates from the rules and general
regulations on investments, and repeatedly violates the
rules relating to conflict of interest, the upper limit of aggra-
vated penalty shall be one per cent of the annual member-
ship contributions.
3. The penalty imposed by the Private Fund Supervisory
Board shall be paid within fifteen days of the receipt of the
legally final judgement, to the account specified in such
judgement.
Section 112.
The Private Fund Supervisory Board shall not impose
any penalty beyond six months after the default or the vio-
lation of obligations becomes known to the Private Fund
Supervisory Board, or beyond two years after the default or
the violation of obligations.
Supervising Commissioner
Section 113.
1. The Private Fund Supervisory Board may recommend
that the fund prepare an action plan if it is assumed that the
fund will not be able to meet its obligations.
2. If the fund fails to comply with the provisions of the
action plan, or the action plan fails to promote safe opera-
tion of the fund, the Private Fund Supervisory Board may
appoint a Supervising Commissioner. The Private Fund
Supervisory Board may also appoint a Supervising Commis-
sioner if the deficiencies discovered in the accounting or
internal control system of the fund are so grave that it is
impossible to evaluate the actual financial standing of the
fund, or if the Board or Directors of the fund may not fulfill
its duties, and thus jeopardises the fund members' interests.
3. The Supervising Commissioner may only be a person
who has no business relations with the fund and is not a
member thereof.
4. The Commissioner shall investigate the financial
standing and financial assets of the fund, and prepare the
fund for the production of a report. The Supervising Com-
missioner shall convene a General Meeting within fifteen
days of the completion of his inspection.
5. The activity of the Supervising Commissioner shall
aim to restore the fund's operability. In this period the fund
shall act in compliance with the directives of the Supervising
Commissioner appointed by the Private Fund Supervisory
Board, and the Supervising Commissioner shall exercise the
rights of the Board of Directors and the Managing Director.
6. The Supervising Commissioner may be appointed for a
period of maximum 180 days; this period, however, may be
extended pending the appointment of a liquidator. In the event
of liquidation proceedings, the appointment of the Supervising
Commissioner shall end upon appointment of a liquidator.
Section 114.
1. The commission of the Supervising Commissioner
shall specify his duties and scope of authority, which shall
exclusively include compliance with and enforcement of the
rules specified in this Act, and legal regulations implement-
ing this Act.
2. The Board of Directors of the fund shall be notified of
the appointment of a Supervising Commissioner.
3. Upon request, the Supervising Commissioner shall
notify the Board of Directors of the fund of the measures
taken by him in writing within three days.
4. The Supervising Commissioner shall be eligible for
remuneration, the amount to be determined by the Presi-
dent of the Private Fund Supervisory Board and payable by
the fund concerned.
Section 115.
If the financial standing of the fund does not enable the
fund to operate in accordance with the Fund Regulations,
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the Private Fund Supervisory Board may order the suspen-
sion of the fund's operation, and may initiate legal proceed-
ings to liquidate the fund.
Revenues of the Private Fund Supervisory Board
Section 116.
Revenues of the Private Fund Supervisory Board are as
follows:
a) supervision fee,
b) other revenues.
Section 117.
1. The funds shall pay the supervision fee to the Private
Fund Supervisory Board from their operational reserves.
2. The supervision fee shall total 0.2% of the member-
ship contributions paid.
Section 118.
1. The supervision fee shall be transferred by the funds
to the account of the Private Fund Supervisory Board on a
quarterly basis, by the thirtieth day of the month following
the quarter under review, on the basis of the fund's actual
membership revenues in the quarter under review.
2. The supervision fee shall be utilised to cover the oper-
ational expenses of the Private Fund Supervisory Board. Cal-
culation, accounting and utilisation of residual funds at the
end of the year shall be governed by legal regulations applic-
able to financial planning, financial management and the
reporting systems of state-funded organisations.
Data Management by the Private Fund Supervi-
sory Board
Section 119.
1. In order to fulfill its tasks as specified in this Act, the
Private Fund Supervisory Board may manage, i. e., store and
use data, including personal data specified in this Act.
2. In order to fulfill its tasks, the Private Fund Superviso-
ry Board may store and use the data, specified in Schedule
No. 2 to this Act, of fund members and the senior officers
of the funds, as well as data pertaining to the conflict of
interest and qualification requirements of the fund's officers
and employees.
Section 120.
The central record keeping of the funds shall be carried
out by the Private Fund Supervisory Board within its own
organisation. If the Private Fund Supervisory Board judges
from the available data that in any fund the safety of benefits
is jeopardised due to some malfunction, or the perfor-
mance-related data of the funds show remarkable dispro-
portion, or it is presumed that the law or legal regulation has
been violated, the Private Fund Supervisory Board shall take
the necessary measures.
Chapter XII. The Private Fund Council
Section 121.
1. The Private Fund Council is the consulting body of the
Private Fund Supervisory Board.
2. Members of the Private Fund Council are as follows:
a) the representatives of the Ministry of Finance, the
Ministry of Welfare and the Ministry of Labour (one repre-
sentative each);
b) the representative(s) of the Alliance(s) of Funds;
c) four independent experts invited by the Minister of
Finance upon the recommendation of the president of the
Private Fund Supervisory Board;
d) the representatives of the State Insurance Superviso-
ry Board, the State Supervisory Board of Money and Capital
Markets, the National Bank of Hungary and the Budapest
Stock Exchange (one representative each);
e) the representative of the Guarantee Fund;
f) a representative delegated by the Pension Insurance
Fund Administration,
g) the representative of chambers in which fund service
providers are members,
h) interest representation bodies in which fund service
providers are members.
3. Members of the Private Fund Council shall be elected
from among Hungarian citizens with no prior criminal
records, who have a higher education degree and a high-
level of expertise in the field of pension systems, investment
or insurance.
4. The President and vice-president of the Private
Fund Council shall be appointed by the Minister of
Finance from among the persons referred to in Paragraph
c) of Subsection (2).
5. The members of the Private Fund Council, with the
exception of the President and the vice-president, shall not
be eligible for any remuneration for carrying out the tasks
assigned to them. The operational conditions of the Private
Fund Council shall be ensured by the Private Fund Supervi-
sory Board.
6. The Private Fund Council shall
a) make recommendations concerning the activities
of the funds and the Guarantee Fund, as well as con-
cerning changes in their operational conditions, their
roles in the money and capital markets, concerning
experience with regard to the implementation of legal
regulations related to the funds, concerning the bills and
drafts of legal regulations related to the scope of respon-
sibilities of the funds, the practice of consistent asset
evaluation and performance assessment techniques of
the funds, the regulations on investment diversification
and concerning the minimum return requirements of the
funds,
b) put forward proposals in the given field and in terms
of ethical conduct, and shall publish these proposals in co-
operation with the Private Fund Supervisory Board,
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c) prepare, have others prepare, and publish profession-
al publications related to the funds.
A-2. The case of Poland: Act on the
Organisation and Operation of Pension
Funds, passed on 28 August 1997
[fragments]
Chapter 21: Supervision of the Operation
of Funds
Article 199
1. The Supervision Authority is established under this
Act as a central public administration body.
2. The Supervision Authority shall be supervised by the
President of the Council of Ministers.
Article 200
1. The task of the Supervision Authority shall be to pro-
tect the interests of Members of Funds and participants of
the employee pension schemes.
2. The task of the Supervision Authority shall be carried
out by:
1) supervising the operation of Funds;
2) inspiring, organising and enhancing the development
of the pension fund system in Poland;
3) supervising the operation of employee pension
schemes;
4) creating and developing public awareness of the pur-
poses and operating principles of the Funds, with particular
regard to rights vested in their Members;
5) creating and developing public awareness of the pur-
poses and operating principles of employee pension
schemes, with particular regard to rights vested in their par-
ticipants;
6) co-operating with state administrative authorities, the
National Bank of Poland, the Social Insurance Office (ZUS),
Societies, entities providing services to Funds as well as
employers' associations, trade unions and other social
organisations, within the scope of developing state policy
and aiming to ensure the secure development of Funds and
employee pension schemes;
7) providing the National Bank of Poland with informa-
tion necessary for carrying out supervision of banks acting
as depository banks and banks which are shareholders in
Societies;
8) providing the Securities and Stock Exchange Com-
mission with information necessary for carrying out
supervision over the operations of the National Deposi-
tary,
9) undertaking other activities provided for in this Act.
Article 201
1. There shall be a president of the Supervision Author-
ity who shall be appointed by the President of the Council
of Ministers for five year terms.
2. The President of the Council of Ministers may
remove the President of Supervision Authority before the
end of his term of office, after obtaining the consent of the
Supervision Authority Advisory Committee referred to in
Article  211 par. 1, expressed in the form of a resolution
passed by an absolute majority of votes in the presence of
at least two-thirds of the Committee members.
3. There shall be Deputy Presidents of the Supervision
Authority who shall be appointed and removed by the Pres-
ident of the Council of Ministers at the motion of the Super-
vision Authority President. Deputy Presidents of the Super-
vision Authority may also be removed on the independent
initiative of the President of the Council of Ministers.
4. The amount of funds to be used as remuneration of
the President, Vice-Presidents, Director General and
employees of the Supervision Authority shall be determined
each year in a Budgetary Law, in relation to the salaries paid
in Universal Societies, including bonuses and other benefits.
5. The Council of Ministers shall by ordinance confer a
charter upon the Supervision Authority which shall specify
its organisation and tasks.
Article 202 
1. Proceedings before the Supervision Authority shall be
conducted in accordance with the Code of Administrative
Procedure, unless otherwise provided herein.
2. A decision of the Supervision Authority may be
appealed against in the Supreme Administrative Court.
3. A request for re-examination of a case by the Super-
vision Authority shall not impede the execution of the
Supervision Authority's decision to cancel a permit for the
establishment of a Society, if the permit is cancelled due to
reasons other than those defined in Article 61.
Article 203
1. The expenses of the Supervision Authority shall be
borne from the State Budget in an amount specified annual-
ly in the Budgetary Law.
2. Universal Societies shall be charged with monthly fees
representing no more than 0.02% of the contributions paid
in a given month to the Open Funds governed by those
societies.
3. Employee Societies shall be charged with quarterly
fees representing no more than 0.2% of the contributions
paid in a given quarter to the Employee Funds governed by
those societies.
4. The employers operating employee pension schemes
shall be charged with quarterly fees representing no more
than 0.1% of the contributions paid in a given quarter in
favour of participants of employee pension schemes.
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5. Half of the proceeds from the fees referred to in par.
2-4 charged by the Supervision Authority shall constitute
revenue of the special purpose fund of the Supervision
Authority which shall be allocated for improving the work
of the Supervision Authority, upgrading the professional
qualifications of its employees and for paying bonuses to
the President, Vice-Presidents, Director General and
employees of the Supervision Authority. The remaining
part of the proceeds shall constitute revenue of the state
budget.
6. The detailed manner of allocating the proceeds con-
stituting revenue of the special purpose fund and the princi-
ples for granting bonuses to employees of the Supervision
Authority shall be determined by the President of the Super-
vision Authority in by-laws approved by the Supervision
Authority Advisory Committee.
7. The principles for granting bonuses to the President,
Vice-presidents and Director General of the Supervision
Authority shall be determined in the statute referred to in
Article 201 par. 5.
8. The Council of Ministers shall issue an ordinance
defining the amount of, and procedure and dates for, paying
the fees referred to in par. 2-4.
Article 204 
1. Within the scope of its supervision over the activities
of the Funds, the Supervision Authority shall in particular
have the following rights and powers: 
1) to request from the Society copies of all documents
relating to the activities of the Fund and to become
acquainted with their content,
2) to request any information or interview any members
of the Board of Management, the Supervisory Board or any
Employees of the Society regarding the activities of the
Fund.
2. A person authorised by the Supervision Authority
President shall have the right to enter the premises of: 
1) a Society - for the purpose of verifying whether the
activities of the Society conform with the law and its statute;
2) a Depositary - for the purpose of verifying whether its
activities relating to the keeping of the Fund Assets conform
with the law and the agreement on keeping the Fund Assets; 
3) an entity entrusted with the keeping of the register of
the Fund Members - for the purpose of verifying whether its
activities relating to the keeping of the register conform
with the law.
3. The person who conducts the inspection is entitled to: 
1) inspect any books, documents and other records,
2) request copies of such documents and records to be
made and released,
3) request any information from members of the statu-
tory governing bodies and employees of the inspected enti-
ties.
4. A Society is under an obligation to ensure that the
person who conducts the inspection is given access to all the
books, documents and other records relating to the activi-
ties of the Fund which are kept by third parties entrusted
with some of the activities under separate agreements.
5. The scope of inspection shall be specified in the
authorisation issued by the Supervision Authority President. 
6. After the person conducting the inspection prepares
an inspection protocol, the Supervision Authority shall noti-
fy the inspected entity of any irregularities discovered and
fix the deadline for amending them.
7. Where irregularities have not been rectified within a
deadline the Supervision Authority may impose on the
inspected entity a penalty of up to PLN 500,000. Where
there have been gross irregularities the Supervision Author-
ity may impose the penalty immediately on them being dis-
covered.
Article 205
1. A Member may make a complaint to the Supervision
Authority against a Fund if the Member believes that the
Fund's activity is not complying with applicable laws or pro-
visions of the Fund's Statute.
2. A complaint may also be made by a person who has
been a Member of the Fund during the six months preced-
ing the making of the complaint.
3. A complaint may also be made to the Supervision
Authority on behalf of a group of Members by a social
organisation whose scope of tasks does not include the con-
ducting of commercial activity.
Article 206
1. The Supervision Authority may demand the convening
of statutory meetings of the Supervisory Board or Board of
Management or a General Meeting of a Society and include
such matters in the agendas of such bodies, as it feels are
necessary in order to exercise proper supervision over the
Fund.
2. In the cases referred to in para. 1 above, the Super-
vision Authority shall delegate its representative to par-
ticipate in the meeting of the Supervisory Board or the
Board of Management, or in the General Meeting of
Shareholders, and such a representative shall be entitled
to speak at the meeting in all matters included in the
agenda.
Article 207
In civil matters relating to the establishment and opera-
tion of Funds, the Supervision Authority President shall have
the rights of the Public Prosecutor, ensuing from the rele-
vant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Article 208
The Supervision Authority President shall submit annual
reports of the Supervision Authority activities to the Presi-
dent of the Council of Ministers.
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Article 209
1. The Supervision Authority President, its Vice-presi-
dents, Director General and employees may not hold
shares in or be members of the Board of Management or
Supervisory Board of a Society, or be bound to a Society by
an employment or service contract or a similar legal rela-
tionship. This prohibition relates also to service contracts or
similar legal relations between a Fund and the above speci-
fied persons. 
2. The provisions of par. 1 above do not prejudice the
provisions on restricting the possibilities of conducting com-
mercial activities by persons occupying public positions.  
Article 210
The provisions of Article 49 shall apply as appropriate to
the Supervision Authority President, its Vice-Presidents,
Director General and employees and to the persons who
are bound with the Supervision Authority by a service con-
tract or a similar legal relationship.
Article 211
1. The Supervision Authority Advisory Committee is
hereby established as an advisory and consulting body of the
Supervision Authority in matters relating to the operation of
Funds and employee pension schemes.
2. The tasks of the Supervision Authority Advisory Com-
mittee will be to:
1) express opinions on draft normative acts regarding
the operation of Funds and employee pension schemes,
2) express opinions on the reports on the Supervision
Authority activities prepared by the  Supervision Authority
President,
3) present to the Supervision Authority opinions in mat-
ters relating to the operation of Funds and employee pen-
sion schemes,
4) give consent to the removal of the Supervision
Authority President,
5) approve the by-laws referred to in Article 203 para. 6.
Article 212
1. The Advisory Committee shall consist of 15 members.
2. Members of the Supervision Authority Advisory
Committee, including its Chairman and Vice-Chairman,
shall be appointed by the President of the Council of Minis-
ters from among individuals having the necessary knowl-
edge and experience of  matters relating to the activities of
the Supervision Authority.
3. At least 6 members of the Supervision Authority Advi-
sory Committee shall be appointed by the President of the
Council of Ministers from among candidates proposed by
the Trilateral Commission for Social and Economic Affairs.
4. The term of office of the Supervision Authority Advi-
sory Committee members shall be six years from the date
of appointment, with one-third of the Committee members
being replaced every two years. Members of the Supervi-
sion Authority Advisory Committee shall perform their
duties until the time their successors are appointed.
5. The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Supervision
Authority Advisory Committee shall be nominated for two-
year terms.
6. The provisions of Article 49 shall apply as appropriate
to the Members of the Supervisory Authority Advisory
Committee.
7. The Supervisory Authority President shall issue an
ordinance specifying the principles for remunerating Mem-
bers of the Supervisory Authority Advisory Committee and
the amount of their remuneration.
Article 213
The operating costs of the Supervision Authority Advi-
sory Committee shall be covered from the State Budget.
Article 214
The working procedures of the Supervision Authority
Advisory Committee shall be included in the by-laws adopt-
ed by the Supervision Authority Advisory Committee and
approved by the President of the Council of Ministers.
A-3. The case of Bulgaria: Supplementary
Voluntary Pension Insurance Act, passed
on 7 July 1999 [fragments]
Chapter Three: Supervision and Licensing
Article 30. 
1. For the purposes of licensing and supervision of the
pension insurance companies involved in supplementary
social security activities, including pension, health and
unemployment insurance, the State Insurance Supervision
Agency  shall be established under the Council of Ministers.
2. The State Insurance Supervision Agency, hereinafter
referred to as the Agency, shall be a legal entity funded by
the budget and with head office in Sofia.
Article 31. 
1. The budget of the Agency shall be approved on annu-
al basis by the Council of Ministers, acting on proposal of
the chairman of the Agency.
2. The revenue of the budget under para 1 shall include
amounts which the agency collects for:
1) fees for license issuance;
2) fees for approval of amendments to the statute of the
pension insurance company;
3) fines and property sanctions under Chapter Thirteen.
3. The fees, fines and property sanctions as referred to
in paragraph 2 shall be determined by an act of the Council
of Ministers.
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Article 32. 
The Council of Ministers shall adopt regulations for the
application of this law and the Rules of Operation regulating
the structure and functions of the Agency. 
Article 33. 
1. The management of the Agency shall be performed by
its Chairman.
2. The chairman of the agency shall meet the require-
ments under Article19. 
3. A Supplementary Social Insurance Council shall be
established under the Agency. 
4. The Supplementary Social Insurance Council shall
consist of seven members: the Minister of Labour and
Social Policy, the Minister of Health Care, the Minister of
Finance, the Minister of Justice and Legal Eurointegration,
the Minister of the Interior, the Chairman of the Security
and Stock Exchange Commission, and the chairman of
the Agency. A representative of the Association of Sup-
plementary Pension Insurance Companies shall also par-
ticipate in the work of the Council with a deliberative
vote.
5. Chairman of the Supplementary Social Insurance
Council shall be the Minister of Labor and Social Policy who
shall convene the Council and chair its meetings.
6. The members of the Council shall not be compensat-
ed for their activity as such.
7. The Supplementary Social Insurance Council shall
make decisions on:
1) issuance and suspension of supplementary social
insurance license within two months following the submis-
sion of the proposal by the Agency;
2) permission for merging, joining, separation, and divi-
sion of supplementary pension insurance companies after
submission of a permission for merging or joining by the
Competition Protection Commission, when its issuance is
mandatory;
3) initiation of bankruptcy proceedings for a supplemen-
tary pension insurance company;
4) approval of the list of depositary banks in co-ordina-
tion with the Bulgarian National Bank, in accordance with
this law.
8. The Council of Ministers shall adopt rules for the
activity of the Supplementary Social Insurance Council.
9. The Council of Ministers shall appoint the chairman of
the Agency and shall determine the number of staff for the
agency.
Article 34. 
The chairman of the Agency may not hold another
salaried office nor is he/she entitled to a remuneration pur-
suant to a private contract except in cases of research or
lecturing activities.
Article 35. 
The Agency shall:
1) Issue and suspend licenses for supplementary social
insurance activities;
2) Supervise the activity of the supplementary social
insurance companies; 
3) Register the Articles of Association and the Rules of
Operation of the supplementary social insurance companies
and their amendments;
4) Issue mandatory instructions for the elimination of
violations of the Law and regulations related to supplemen-
tary pension insurance as well as for changes required in the
Rules of Operation of the pension insurance companies;
5) Develop regulations on supplementary social insur-
ance;
6) Impose measures for the financial rehabilitation of
supplementary social insurance companies;
7) Submit to the court proposals for termination and liq-
uidation of the supplementary social insurance companies in
case of circumstances stipulated in this Act or other laws
and regulations;
8) Prohibit the conclusion of new insurance contracts for
a certain period of time;
9) Approve the list of the depository banks in co-ordina-
tion with the Bulgarian National Bank;
10) Approve upon co-ordination with the Institute of
Certified Public Accountants the list of certified public
accountants that are entitled to audit supplementary social
insurance companies and voluntary pension funds;
11) Approve the biometric tables that may be used by
supplementary social insurance companies and voluntary
pension funds;
12) Establish and maintain its own information system
and a register of the supplementary social insurance compa-
nies and voluntary pension funds;
13) Issue a periodic bulletin and other publications relat-
ed to the performed activities.
Article 36. 
1. For performance of its activities the Agency shall be
entitled to:
1) require information, explanations and reports;
2) assign its officials to attend the meetings of the bodies
of the supplementary social insurance companies when
issues put forward by the Agency shall be discussed;
3) perform inspections of the depository banks jointly
with the Bulgarian National Bank concerning deposits of the
supplementary social insurance companies and funds.
2. In the execution of its activities the Agency shall be
obliged:
1) To study in detail each complaint submitted by an
insured person in a supplementary social insurance fund; 
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2) To issue mandatory prescriptions in case of justified
complaints to the supplementary social insurance company
for the purpose of elimination of the respective violation;
3) In case of occurrence of justified suspicions for a
criminal offense during the investigation, to notify the pros-
ecutor's office;
4) To keep the confidentiality of the information of sup-
plementary social insurance companies and depositary
banks.
3. When performing its supervisory functions the
Agency and the persons authorised by it shall be liable for
caused damages. 
Article 37. 
1. The authorised officials of the Agency when perform-
ing their official duties shall be entitled to free access to all
business premises and to the documentation of the supple-
mentary pension insurance companies and funds.
2. The Agency officials shall be obliged to keep the con-
fidentiality of all information and data to which they have
had access while performing their duties. Disclosure of such
information shall only be done in the manner determined by
the Agency.
Article 38. 
1. The pension insurance company shall submit to the
Agency a written application to obtain a license to engage in
supplementary pension insurance activities, attaching the
following documents:
1) A certified copy of the court decision on company
registration;
2) The Articles of Association of the pension insurance
company and all other documents related to the establish-
ment of the company;
3) A bank certificate from the depositary banks or a
court decision for the fully deposited capital under Arti-
cle14, para 3;
4) Estimates for the activity of the pension insurance
company and the voluntary pension fund for the first three
years, including income and expenditure estimates;
5) Actuarial projections for all offered pension schemes;
6) The full name and passport number of the actuary;
7) Documents, including declarations, proving compli-
ance with the provisions of Article 19;
8) A list of the shareholders being in possession, direct-
ly or through related persons, of over 10% of the shares, or
who are in a position to exercise control over the pension
insurance company;
9)  Samples of the insurance contracts;
10) Rules of the pension insurance company;
11) A report according to an approved model with
respect to persons having inscribed for 1 per cent and over
1 per cent of the capital. 
2. All entities under para 1, item 11 shall submit written
declarations according to an approved model with respect
to the origin of the funds used to make contributions against
inscribed shares and to the effect that the funds have not
been borrowed and concerning the taxes paid by them in
the last 5 years.
3. The Regional Court for the head office of the pension
insurance company shall enter in the Commercial Register
the company with sole activity pension insurance after sub-
mission of a license issued by the Agency.
Article 39. 
1. The Agency shall declare its position on the applica-
tion for a license as referred to in Article 17 not later than
three months after the submission of the documents as
referred to in Article 38.
2. The Agency shall notify the applicant in writing about
its decision not later than 7 days after making the decision.
3. The license is issued for an unlimited period of time.
4. The decision for license issuance shall come into force
upon its issuance and shall be promulgated in the State
Gazette.
Article 40. 
1. The Agency shall refuse to issue a license in case of
non-compliance with the provisions of the Law.
2. In the cases described in paragraph 1 the Agency shall
notify the applicant and shall determine a certain period of
time, not less than two months, to eliminate discrepancies.
3. If the applicant fails to eliminate the discrepancies
within the time limit determined in paragraph 2, the Agency
shall refuse to issue a license by a motivated decision.
4. In case of refusal, the applicant may reapply for a
license not earlier than 6 months since the date of coming
into effect of the decision for refusal.
Article 41. 
1. The Agency shall suspend the issued license on the
basis of a substantiated decision when:
1) the information and data submitted for the purpose
of a license issuance are false;
2) the pension insurance company fails to make or
delays payments under the insurance contracts;
3) the mandatory provisions of the Agency are not being
complied with;
4) the interests of the persons insured in the voluntary
pension fund are exposed to a real and immediate threat;
5) the persons insured in the voluntary pension fund are
less that 10,000 after the first two years from the date of
licensing.
2.  The Agency may provide an additional period for the
cases as referred to in para 1, item 5, but not longer than
for 6 months.
Article 42. 
1. After suspension of the pension license, the pension
insurance company may not enter into new contracts for
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voluntary pension insurance and amend the conditions,
including the period and amount of the contributions under
contracts already concluded.
2. The Agency shall notify the court of registration of the
company regarding the license suspension in order to cause
the termination and commencement of liquidation proce-
dure of the pension insurance company and shall promul-
gate the notice in the State Gazette.
3. Upon suspension of the license the Agency shall
appoint a questor to control the pension insurance compa-
ny's activities until the moment of appointment of a liquida-
tor.
4. Suspension of a license shall not relieve the pension
insurance company from its obligations under signed con-
tracts.
5. The pension insurance company shall dispose with its
property and with the assets of the voluntary pension fund
after a written consent of the questor.
Article 43. 
The resolutions of the Agency shall be subject to appeal
to the Supreme Administrative Court in accordance with
the provisions of the Administrative Proceedings Act.
A-4. The case of Lithuania: Pension Funds
Act, passed in May 1999 [fragments]
Article 41. State Supervision of the Operations of
Pension Funds
1. State supervision of the operations of pension funds
shall be carried out by the Securities Commission. In pursuit
of implementation of this Law the Securities Commission
shall be entitled to issue legal acts within its terms of refer-
ence. 
2. When issuing permits for pension funds and exercising
supervision over their operations the Securities Commission
shall carry out the following functions:
1) draft, approve changes of and acknowledge as invalid
the rules that regulate issuing of permits for pension funds,
management enterprises and depositories; as well as the
establishing, restructuring, operations, reorganisation and
liquidation of the pension funds;
2) draft, approve, change and acknowledge as invalid the
formats of periodical reports of pension funds to the pen-
sion scheme participants, and establish procedures of sub-
mitting and publication of said documents;
3) provide official explanations and recommendations on
all the issues of the pension fund activities;
4) issue and revoke operation permits for the pension
funds and their management enterprises and restrict their
operations;
5) monitor, analyse, inspect and supervise in other ways
the operations of pension funds and pension fund manage-
ment bodies;
6) set the rules for managing pension accounts;
7) apply the sanctions stipulated in the Republic of
Lithuania Administrative Code to the heads of pension
funds, management enterprises, depositories and auditors
of said enterprises for violations of this law and other legal
acts;
8) apply sanctions provided for in this and other laws to
the persons who violate this law and the rules and instruc-
tions approved by the Securities Commission;
9) organise and carry out the inspections of the manage-
ment enterprises and depositories;
10) carry out other functions established by this Law.
3. During the inspection officials of the Securities Com-
mission have a right to:
1) receive explanations from the persons under investi-
gation in relation to violations;
2) temporarily (up to 30 days) take with them docu-
ments of the inspected pension funds, their management
enterprises and depositories that may be used as evidence
of violations. When taking documents they must leave the
motivated resolution regarding taking the documents and
the description of taken documents;
3) request to make copies of the accounting documents,
agreements and other documents which are considered by
the Securities Commission as important for the inspection:
4) freely enter the premises of the pension funds, their
management enterprises, and depositories; check account-
ing books, documents and other information sources need-
ed for the check, provided they produce the service certifi-
cate and the resolution of the Securities Commission or its
chairman;
5) to receive the data, certificates and copies of the doc-
uments about financial operations related with the object of
investigation, if they provide the motivated resolution of the
Securities Commission or its chairman.
4. The Securities Commission shall be entitled to appeal
in court against persons who impede the implementation of
the rights of the Securities Commission provided for in part
3 of this Article which are necessary to investigate the viola-
tions of the law. These cases are investigated by the District
Court of Vilnius. Upon receipt of the request by the Securi-
ties Commission, within 24 hours the court must analyse it
and issue a resolution obligating the person to perform
actions requested by the Commission, abstain from actions
impeding the investigation, or from rejecting the request of
the Securities Commission. The Securities Commission shall
not be charged the stamp duty for submitting the corre-
sponding request. In the event the term allotted for investi-
gating the case expires on a day-off the term shall be count-
ed starting with the first working day following the day-off.
Upon receiving the request, the copy thereof shall not be
sent to the applicant, and the request to the court to submit
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its opinion on the request is not submitted. The applicant
shall be notified on the course of the case investigation. The
request may also be expressed verbally. Participation of
third persons, their representatives and other interested
persons in the court session is not obligatory, and summons
to them shall not be sent. The verdict arrived at by the Dis-
trict Court of Vilnius shall not be appealed and is effected
from the moment the decision is passed. 
5. Instructions of the Securities Commission to the pen-
sion funds, management enterprises, depositories or their
managers regarding elimination of violations of the laws and
other legal acts shall be binding.
6. Employees of the Securities Commission must ensure
confidentiality of all the commercial secrets of which they
had become aware when performing their duties. Employ-
ees shall be held responsible in accordance with the laws for
using information not for the targeted purposes, or for
other illegitimate actions.
7. The Ministry of Social Security and Labour shall mon-
itor the compliance of pension schemes with requirements
stipulated in this Law, control payment of benefits, protec-
tion of the rights of pension scheme participants when mod-
ifying the programs, and supervise the compliance of the
pension agreements with collective and employment agree-
ments.
8. Supervisory institutions envisaged in this law may
request to carry out their orders, and shall be entitled to
inspect, control or carry out investigations in order to
ensure that pension funds, management enterprises or
depositories comply with this Law and other legal acts and
regulations related to it.
9. The Securities Commission shall have the right, fol-
lowing the procedure laid down in the Law on Legal Pro-
tection of Personal Data, to get access to the data of per-
sons who are or intend to become managers of pension
funds, management enterprises or depositories in order to
make sure that the reputation of these persons is impecca-
ble and that they are entitled to take such positions.
10. Pension funds may appeal in court against the deci-
sions of the supervisory institutions stipulated in this Law.
Article 42. Consequences of Violating the Law
1.Economic entities that had violated this Law must:
1) fulfill the orders of the Securities Commission to ter-
minate operations, restore the original situation, terminate
or change agreements, fulfill other commitments;
2) compensate the damage;
3) implement the sanctions imposed by the Securities
Commission.
2. The Securities Commission shall be entitled to
impose monetary fines on:
1) economic entities operating as pension funds without
the permit, stipulated in part 1 of Article 5. The size of the
fine may be as high as double the amount of illegitimately
received income;
2) economic entities operating as pension fund manage-
ment enterprises without the permit stipulated in part 1 of
Article 7. The size of the fine may be as high as double the
size of illegitimately received income;
3) pension funds that enter into pension agreements
within the scope of pension schemes not registered with
the Securities Commission. The size of the fine may be as
high as 100,000 Litas.
3. Application of the sanctions stipulated in part 2 of this
Article should not release the managers of economic enti-
ties from the civil, administrative and criminal responsibility
provided by law. 
4. The decision of the Securities Commission regarding
imposing administrative fines may be appealed against in
court following procedures set out in the laws of the Repub-
lic of Lithuania. Decisions of the Securities Commission
regarding application of sanctions stipulated in part 2 of this
Article may be appealed against in court within one month.
The appeal shall not suspend the implementation of the
orders or resolutions of the Securities Commission to elim-
inate violations of the laws or other legal acts, unless the
court states otherwise.
5. Fines shall be paid to the budget no later than within
one moth of the date of receipt of the resolution to impose
the fine upon the pension fund, management enterprise,
depository or their managers.
6. In the event that within the period stipulated in the 5
of this Article the economic entity fails to pay the imposed
fine and does not provide to the Securities Commission the
verdict of the court to suspend or terminate the resolution
on the fine, the fine shall be exacted from the income of the
economic entity without the need to bring a case. 
7. Within one month from the date of receipt of the res-
olution of the Securities Commission the economic entities
may appeal in court regarding revocation or amendment of
the said resolution.
8. The court appeal shall not suspend the implementa-
tion of the orders and resolutions of the Securities Com-
mission, unless the court advises otherwise.
A-5. The case of Estonia: Pension Funds
Act, passed on 10 June 1998 (RT * I
1998, 61,979) [fragments]
Introductory remarks
The reform of the current pay-as-you-go pension sys-
tem in Estonia, which started in 1997, is part of a wide pro-
gramme of structural reforms. The goal of the reform is to
create a new three-tier pension system by the year 2002
(Ministry of Finance, 1999).
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The first pillar is the state pension, operating as a com-
pulsory system, based on current financing from social secu-
rity contributions (pay-as-you-go system). The second pillar,
similar to the Hungarian and Polish models, is planned as the
mandatory funded pension, managed by the private sector.
Employees will make mandatory contributions of a defined
sum into the pension funds created. The third pillar is a
completely voluntary pension, administered either by life
insurance companies with a special licence or managing
companies (OECD 1999).
Pension funds, operating as voluntary institutions, exist in
Estonia since 1992. However, they were only regularised
from the legal point of view at a later date, by the Act
regarding Voluntary Pension Funds. In order to stimulate
voluntary savings for old age, the government introduced
tax allowances for those who participate in such pro-
grammes. Employees are entitled to deduct voluntary con-
tributions up to 15% of their income. Within this tier, insur-
ance companies dominate, constituting more than 70% of
the contracts.
The Pension Funds Act, which regulates the functioning
of pension funds within the second pillar, came into effect 1
August 1998. This act functions under the Act on Invest-
ment Funds. In July of 1999, the government made the first
decisions regarding the principles of implementing the sec-
ond pillar. In March 1999, at the proposal of the Finance
Ministry's licensing commission, the first licence for the
management of pension fund was issued.
According to the Pension Funds Act, the role of the super-
visory institution is assigned to the Ministry of Finance. In this
regard, the case of Estonian pension reform resembles the
model applied in Lithuania, where similarly a separate, inde-
pendent supervisory institution has not been chosen.
Chapter 2
§ 5. Activity licence
1. Activity licences for the management of pension funds
(hereinafter activity licences) are issued and revoked by a
directive of the Minister of Finance. Upon refusal to issue an
activity licence or revocation of a licence, the justification
shall be indicated in the directive.
2. The committee provided for in subsection 19 (4) of
the Investment Funds Act shall make proposals to the Min-
ister of Finance regarding the issue and revocation of activ-
ity licences, the grant of the deadline specified in subsec-
tion 10 (2) of this Act, and the request for additional infor-
mation from applicants pursuant to subsection 8 (2) of this
Act.
3. Activity licences are issued for an unspecified term.
4. An activity licence is not transferable, and its acquisi-
tion or use by other persons is prohibited.
§ 6. Application for activity licence
1. An activity licence for management of a pension fund
may only be applied for by a management company which,
at the time of application, has been operating as a manage-
ment company for at least eighteen months and which has
managed a contractual investment fund during the last
twelve months.
2. In order to apply for an activity licence, the manage-
ment board of a management company shall submit the fol-
lowing documents and information to the Securities Inspec-
torate:
1) an application to obtain a pension management com-
pany activity licence and to register the pension fund rules;
2) the resolution of the general meeting on amendment
of the articles of association;
3) an extract from the registry card of the commercial
register;
4) the last approved annual report;
5) the balance sheet and income statement as at the end
of the month prior to submission of the application if, upon
submission of the application, more than seven months have
passed since the end of the financial year;
6) an activity report which contains all material informa-
tion and an analysis of the activities and development of the
management company to date as at the last day of the
month prior to submission of the application;
7) the last approved annual or half-yearly reports of the
investment funds managed, and a statement of investments
which is compiled as at the end of the last working day of
the month prior to submission;
8) statements, which upon submission of the application
shall not be more than ten days old, from the local Tax
Board Office certifying the absence of tax arrears
of the management company and the legal persons spec-
ified in clause 13) of this subsection;
9) information on the members of the management
board and supervisory board of the management company
which sets out each member’s given name and surname,
personal identification code or date of birth in the absence
of a personal identification code, residence, educational
background, and a complete list of places of employment
and positions held during the last five years;
10) the information specified in clause 9) of this subsec-
tion on other members of the management of the manage-
ment company (managing director, chief accountant etc.)
and the persons who conduct the internal audits;
11) information on the procurator and auditor of the
management company which sets out the given name and
surname, residence and personal identification code or date
of birth in the absence of a personal identification code of
each;
12) information on the shareholders of the management
company which sets out the name, registry code, or per-
sonal identification code or date of birth in the absence of a
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personal identification code, and the number of shares and
votes of each shareholder;
13) information on shareholders who directly or indi-
rectly or together with undertakings belonging to the same
group of companies hold more than 10 per cent of the share
capital or of the votes represented by shares of the man-
agement company; in the case of a legal person, the name,
registry code, and annual accounts for the previous financial
year, and the given names, surnames and personal identifi-
cation codes or dates of birth in the absence of a personal
identification code of the members of the management
board or of the body substituting for the management
board, and of the supervisory board upon the existence of
a supervisory board; in the case of a natural person, the
information specified in clause 9) of this subsection;
14) information on companies in which the holding of
the management company, a member of its management
board or supervisory board, the procurator, the fund man-
ager specified in clause 17) of this subsection, or of the
above-mentioned persons combined, is greater than 10 per
cent; this information shall also include the amount of share
capital, a list of the areas of activity and the percentage of
holding of the above-mentioned persons;
15) the resolution to establish the pension fund;
16) a three-year business plan;
17) information on the fund manager of the pension
fund which sets out the information specified in clause 9) of
this subsection, and a detailed overview of the investment
funds managed by him or her (including the value of the
assets, the rate of return, the dynamics of the structure of
investments, and a complete overview of precepts issued,
of compliance with such precepts and of cases specified in
§§ 45 and 49 of the Investment Funds Act);
18) the pension fund rules;
19) the pension fund prospectus;
20) a depositary contract specified in § 86 of the Invest-
ment Funds Act;
21) the annual accounts of the depositary for the previ-
ous financial year;
22) the given names, surnames and personal identifica-
tion codes or dates of birth in the absence of a personal
identification code of the members of the supervisory board
and management board, and of the procurator and auditor
of the depositary;
23) information on the shareholders of the depositary
who hold more than 5 per cent of the votes represented by
shares; the information shall set out the name, registry
code, or personal identification code or date of birth in the
absence of a personal identification code, and the number
of shares and votes of each shareholder;
24) an overview of the activities of the depositary to
date as a depositary for investment funds;
25) proof of payment of the state fee.
3. The report specified in clause (2) 6) of this section
shall, among other matters, set out a description and analy-
sis of the following information:
1) the amount of share capital and shareholders' equity;
2) changes in the investment policy of the investment
funds managed;
3) the market value, net asset value, rate of return of the
assets and structure of investments of the investment funds
managed;
4) the number of units which have been issued and the
number of units which have been redeemed;
5) the number of unit-holders who are natural persons
and their proportion in the investment funds managed by
the applicant;
6) the amount of management fees, depositary’s charges
and other expenses incurred on behalf of the investment
funds;
7) the management structure of the management com-
pany, the organisational and technical administration of its
activities, and the rights, obligations and liability of persons
involved in the management of investment funds.
4. The business plan specified in clause (2) 16) of this
section (hereinafter business plan) shall set out a forecast
and analysis of all the important economic indicators of the
pension fund and the pension management company, and
the rights, obligations and liability of persons involved in the
management structure of the management company and in
the management of the pension fund, and also a description,
forecast and analysis of the following factors:
1) the number of units to be issued and the number of
units to be redeemed;
2) the organisation of the issue of units;
3) the number of unit-holders;
4) the market value, net asset value and rate of return of
the assets of the pension fund;
5) the investment policy and structure of investments of
the pension fund (divided by different asset classes - shares,
debt instruments, immovable property, etc.,
issued by issuers of different countries, by different sec-
tors of the economy, etc.);
6) risks and rate of return by the different types of
investment;
7) the share capital, balance sheet total and profit of the
pension management company;
8) the rates for and amount of proceeds from manage-
ment fees, depositary’s charges, and the issue and redemp-
tion fees of units;
9) the amount and structure of the management
expenses of the pension fund;
10) the development of the organisational structure and
technical administration of the pension management com-
pany.
5. At the request of the Securities Inspectorate, a man-
agement company is required to submit more specific infor-
mation and documents concerning information
subject to submission.
6. The Minister of Finance may establish the procedure
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for submission of the information specified in subsection (2)
of this section.
7. If a management company fails to submit all the infor-
mation and documents specified in subsection 2 if this sec-
tion, or if the information or documents are incorrect,
incomplete or incorrectly prepared, or do not comply with
the requirements established by legislation, the Securities
Inspectorate shall inform the applicant thereof in writing.
The applicant shall eliminate the deficiencies within twenty
calendar days after receipt of such notifice.
§ 7. Refusal to issue activity licence
1. Issue of an activity licence shall be refused if:
1) the applicant for an activity licence fails to submit all
the information and documents specified in § 6 of this Act,
or such information or documents are incorrect, incomplete
or incorrectly prepared, or do not comply with the require-
ments provided by legislation;
2) the applicant does not comply with the requirements
established for pension management companies by legisla-
tion;
3) the applicant has violated provisions of legislation, the
rules or articles of association of the investment fund, or the
management contract specified in § 72 of the Investment
Funds Act, or has provided misleading information to the
public or violated good business practices in some other
way;
4) the applicant does not have the necessary funds or
experience to operate as a pension management company
with success and continuity;
5) the persons specified in clauses 6 (2) 9), 10), 13) and
17) of this Act do not comply with the requirements pro-
vided by legislation;
6) the knowledge, skills, experience and other capabilities
and characteristics of the persons referred to in clause 5) of
this subsection are not adequate to ensure sufficient protec-
tion of the interests of the unit-holders of the pension fund;
7) the pension fund rules do not reflect all the essential
rules of the operation of a pension fund in full, clearly and
unambiguously, or contain provisions which are misleading
or contradictory, or the pension fund rules do not ensure
promotion of the best interests of the unit-holders of the
pension fund;
8) the investment policy proposed in the rules and busi-
ness plan of the pension fund does not ensure adequate risk-
spreading, or the necessary reliability and sustainable
growth of the assets of the pension fund;
9) the business plan submitted is incomplete, contains
contradicting and inadequate information or assessments,
or upon implementation would not be adequate to ensure
protection of the interests of the unit-holders of the pen-
sion fund;
10) the depositary does not comply with the require-
ments established for depositaries of pension funds pursuant
to law;
11) the depositary has violated provisions of Acts, other
legislation, the rules or articles of association of the invest-
ment fund, or the depositary contract;
12) the depositary contract contains provisions which
are contradictory, ambiguous, or which prevent the deposi-
tary or pension management company from performing
their duties in full, or which for some other reason do not
enable promotion of the best interests of the unit-holders of
the pension fund;
13) the applicant or the persons specified in clause 5) of
this subsection are not sufficiently reliable nor capable to the
necessary extent of ensuring promotion of the interests of
the unit-holders of the pension fund.
2. Among other matters, the following shall be consid-
ered upon assessment of the provisions of clause (1) 4) of
this section:
1) the level of the organisational and technical adminis-
tration of the activities of the applicant;
2) the professional qualifications and experience of per-
sons engaged in the management of investment funds, and
transparency of their rights, obligations and
liability;
3) the value, rate of return and sustainability of growth
of the assets of the investment funds managed by the appli-
cant;
4) the number of unit-holders who are natural persons
and their proportion in the investment funds managed by
the applicant;
5) the level of risk-spreading, and experience in making
different types of investments (shares, debt instruments,
immovables, derivative instruments, issuers from different
countries, different sectors of the economy).
§ 8. Decision to issue activity licence
1. The Minister of Finance shall decide to issue or refuse
to issue an activity licence within ninety days after submis-
sion of an application and the information specified in sub-
section 6 (2) of this Act to the Securities Inspectorate by an
applicant.
2. In order that a decision be made, the management
company, depositary and Securities Inspectorate are
required to submit additional documents and information at
the request of the Minister of Finance. The Minister of
Finance shall issue a directive to request additional docu-
ments and information.
3. The following shall be indicated on an activity licence:
1) the number of the activity licence;
2) the name and commercial registry code of the pen-
sion management company;
3) the area of activity permitted by the activity licence;
4) the date of issue of the activity licence;
5) the issuer of the activity licence.
4. An activity licence, a copy of the directive of the Min-
ister of Finance to issue or refuse to issue the activity
licence, and a copy of directives specified in subsection (2)
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of this section and subsection 20 (3) of this Act shall be sent
to the applicant within three working days after the issue of
such directive.
§ 9. Termination of activity licence
An activity licence terminates:
1) upon expiry of the term of validity of the activity
licence issued to a pension management company for the
management of investment funds;
2) four months after issue of the activity licence if the
management company has not commenced issue of the
units of the pension fund;
3) upon transfer of the management of a pension fund,
if as a result the pension management company no longer
manages any pension funds;
4) upon revocation of the activity licence.
§ 10. Revocation of activity licence
1. An activity licence shall be revoked if:
1) it becomes evident that information submitted upon
application for the activity licence which was of material
importance in the decision to issue the activity licence is
false; also in cases where false information has been sub-
mitted to the Minister of Finance or the Securities Inspec-
torate, or upon repeated failure to submit information on
time;
2) the pension management company or the persons
specified in clauses 6 (2) 9), 10), 13) and 17) of this Act do
not comply with the requirements provided by legislation;
3) the pension management company has in the course
of its activities violated provisions of legislation or the pen-
sion fund rules, or if the interests of the unit-holders of the
pension fund have been harmed by the violation;
4) the pension management company provided materi-
ally incorrect or misleading information or advertising con-
cerning its activities, the members of its directing bodies, or
its shareholders to the public;
5) the pension management company has failed to
implement a precept of the Securities Inspectorate for the
specified term or to the extent prescribed;
6) the circumstances specified in clauses 7 (1) 3), 4), 6)
or 13) of this Act become evident.
2. Prior to a decision to revoke an activity licence, the
Minister of Finance, by a directive, may grant a pension
management company a term for elimination of deficiencies
which are the basis for revocation.
3. A copy of the directive of the Minister of Finance by
which an activity licence is revoked or the term specified in
subsection (2) of this section is determined shall be prompt-
ly sent to the person specified in the directive and to the
depositary of the pension fund managed by the person.
§ 20. Amendment of pension fund rules
1. The permission of the Minister of Finance is required
for amendment of pension fund rules.
2. In addition to the provisions of subsection 36 (3) of
the Investment Funds Act, a justification and analysis of the
effects of the amendments on the further development of
the pension fund and on the interests of the unit-holders of
the pension fund, and the position of the management
board of the depositary concerning the amendments to the
pension fund rules, shall be submitted in order to amend
pension fund rules. Upon entry into a new depositary con-
tract, the information specified in clauses 6 (2) 21)-24) of
this Act shall also be submitted.
3. The Minister of Finance shall decide to grant or refuse
to grant the permission specified in subsection 1 of this sec-
tion by issuing a directive within forty days after submission
of a corresponding application and the prescribed informa-
tion to the Securities Inspectorate by the applicant.
4. The permission specified in subsection (1) of this sec-
tion shall be refused if the amendments to the pension fund
rules would harm the interests of the unit-holders of the
pension fund or if other circumstances specified in subsec-
tion 7 (1) of this Act become evident.
§ 38. Investment in deposits
1. Assets of a pension fund may only be invested in the
deposits of credit institutions located in Estonia, the Euro-
pean Union or states entered on a list approved by the Min-
ister of Finance.
2. The assets of a pension fund invested in the deposits
of a credit institution shall total not more than 20 per cent
of the market value of the assets of the pension fund.
3. The assets of a pension fund deposited in a single
credit institution shall total not more than 5 per cent of the
market value of the assets of the pension fund.
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